The government's push to protect Kenyan jobs is understandable. But when economic frustration is directed at foreign traders and small-scale businesses, that’s where the danger is.
Kenya should look closely at what has happened in South Africa before it goes down the same path.
President William Ruto’s directive that foreigners operating small-scale businesses and hawking activities should close their enterprises has brought this question into sharper focus, particularly with the administrative deadline taking effect on September 7.
The regime has since clarified that the directive is aimed at foreign nationals operating without the requisite approvals, and not those lawfully working or running businesses in Kenya.
That distinction is important because Kenya’s legal framework does not treat all foreign nationals in the same way. A person operating a business without the required permit is in a different position from one who is lawfully resident and licensed.
Recognised refugees are governed by Kenya’s refugee framework, while citizens of East African Community (EAC) partner states benefit from regional commitments on the movement of persons, workers and the right of establishment.
Further, the EAC Common Market provides for non-discrimination on the basis of nationality while allowing partner states to regulate economic activity through their national laws.
Kenya’s refugee policy makes this feature important because the country hosts approximately 857,065 refugees and asylum seekers, while the Shirika Plan promotes socioeconomic inclusion and self-reliance.
The same principle should guide foreign economic actors. What matters is lawful operation and contribution to Kenya, not nationality alone.
The concern becomes sharper following the regime’s decision to end Tata Chemicals’ operations at Lake Magadi. Foreign investors should meet clear obligations to create jobs, pay taxes, build local supply chains and add value. The regime says this is about local industrialisation, while Tata disputes the compliance allegations.
For Kenyan traders, however, restricting foreign competition does not address the deeper constraints they face. Limited access to affordable credit, inadequate trading spaces, weak infrastructure, restricted markets and high operating costs continue to hold small businesses back.
Removing competitors may create space temporarily, but it will not make Kenyan enterprises more competitive. Protecting Kenyan livelihoods therefore requires building the capacity of local businesses to survive, grow and compete.
The economic case for looking beyond nationality is also clear from Kenya’s own dependence on cross-border economic activity. CBK reports that remittances reached $4.96 billion (Sh642 billion) in the 12 months to June 2026, while the latest KNBS household survey recorded Sh931.8 billion in remittance inflows between June 2024 and May 2025. These demonstrate how deeply Kenyan households and the wider economy are connected to people working and doing business beyond the country’s borders.
South Africa offers a cautionary lesson about where economic frustration can lead when questions of jobs, migration and competition are framed in terms of nationality. More than 178,000 African migrants have left South Africa in recent months, including more than 115,000 who returned to Zimbabwe and more than 56,000 to Malawi, while about 19,000 were formally deported.
Kenya is not South Africa, but the experience shows how quickly economic grievances can become questions of belonging and how difficult it becomes to separate lawful enforcement of immigration from broader hostility towards foreigners.
Kenya has every right to protect its workers, regulate foreign businesses and demand more from companies that profit from its resources. The question is where that protection leads. If nationality is the lens through which economic problems are explained and addressed, Kenya could create tensions it may later struggle to contain. What is happening in South Africa should be a warning.
Programme Manager for Political Accountability in State Institutions at theKenya Human Rights Commission
