K’ONYANGO: Beyond Agoa: Why multilateralism matters for Africa

The United States’ decision to extend the African Growth and Opportunity Act by only three years has been presented as a gesture of goodwill toward Africa. Some policymakers and commentators have rushed to welcome the move as proof that Washington remains committed to the continent.

Yet beneath the diplomatic niceties lies an uncomfortable truth: Africa has little reason to celebrate. A short-term extension of Agoa does not signal strategic partnership; it exposes the fragility, conditionality and limitations of a trade framework that has long underperformed Africa’s development ambitions.

Rather than clinging to unilateral trade preferences, Africa should be using this moment to deepen its commitment to multilateralism and rules-based global cooperation.

Agoa has always been an asymmetric arrangement. It grants selected African countries preferential access to the US market, but only on Washington’s terms. Eligibility can be withdrawn at any time, based on political or ideological considerations that often have little to do with trade performance.

This structural imbalance means African economies are perpetually operating under uncertainty. A three-year extension does not solve this problem; it reinforces it. No serious industrial policy can be built on a trade window that may close with a change of mood in Congress or the White House.

More troubling is the short duration itself. Three years is not a development horizon; it is barely an investment cycle. Manufacturing, agro-processing and value-added exports require long-term planning, stable market access, infrastructure investment and skills development.

When preferences are renewed in brief increments, investors hesitate, supply chains remain shallow and African countries are locked into exporting a narrow range of low-value goods. The extension, therefore, sustains dependence rather than transformation.

Agoa’s track record also warrants sober reflection. After more than two decades, the initiative has failed to significantly alter Africa’s position in global trade. Exports under Agoa remain concentrated in raw materials and a handful of sectors such as apparel, benefiting only a small number of countries.

Most African states either lack the productive capacity to take advantage of the scheme or face non-tariff barriers that undermine its theoretical benefits. If Agoa were truly transformative, Africa would not still be grappling with chronic trade deficits, limited industrialisation and vulnerability to external shocks.

The political context surrounding the extension further dampens enthusiasm. Trade preferences are increasingly weaponised in today’s geopolitical environment.

As great power competition intensifies, Africa is often pressured to ‘choose sides,’ with access to markets framed as a reward for political alignment. This is not partnership; it is leverage. Africa’s development cannot be contingent on external approval of its domestic or foreign policy choices. Sovereignty loses meaning when economic access is conditional and revocable.

In contrast, multilateralism offers Africa something Agoa never can: predictability, inclusivity and collective bargaining power. A rules-based multilateral trading system, though imperfect, reduces arbitrary decision-making and levels the playing field for smaller economies.

Through institutions and agreements that bind all parties, African countries gain legal certainty rather than discretionary favours. This is particularly important for a continent seeking to industrialise and integrate into global value chains on fairer terms.

Africa’s own experience supports this argument. The African Continental Free Trade Area embodies the logic of multilateralism by prioritising cooperation, harmonisation and shared growth.

Instead of competing for unilateral preferences from external powers, African states can trade more with each other, build regional value chains and present a unified front in global negotiations. External partners are far more likely to engage seriously with Africa when it speaks collectively rather than as fragmented, preference-seeking economies.

Moreover, multilateralism aligns with Africa’s long-term strategic interests in a multipolar world. As global economic power diffuses, reliance on a single market or patron becomes increasingly risky.

Diversified trade relations — across Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Global South — provide resilience and choice. Multilateral frameworks make such diversification possible by emphasising cooperation over coercion and reciprocity over dependency.

Supporters of Agoa often argue that “something is better than nothing.” But this mindset is precisely what has kept Africa trapped in low ambition arrangements for decades.

The question is not whether Agoa provides marginal benefits to some exporters; it is whether it advances Africa’s structural transformation. On that measure, a short-term extension is not a breakthrough — it is a reminder of how low the bar has been set.

Africa does not need charity dressed up as trade policy. It needs equitable partnerships, technology transfer, infrastructure investment and fair access to markets under stable rules.

These goals are far more compatible with multilateralism than with unilateral preference schemes that can be expanded, reduced, or withdrawn at will.

The three-year extension of Agoa should therefore be met with realism, not excitement. Africa should use the time not to celebrate, but to recalibrate — strengthening continental integration, deepening South–South cooperation and asserting its place in a genuinely multilateral global order. Development is not achieved by waiting for renewals. It is built by shaping the rules of the system itself.