MBOYA: From BRI tracks to global mix: Time to detach the brand from Beijing's balance sheet

China’s Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, was never meant to be a Chinese monopoly on infrastructure, as often insinuated.

Official Chinese policy, from the State Council white papers to Foreign Ministry statements, defines it from the lens of “extensive consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits,” and explicitly frame the BRI as a platform for equal participation by partner countries and international actors. For instance, the 2023 white paper, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: A Key Pillar of the Global Community of Shared Future’, calls for “a long-term, stable, sustainable and risk-controlled investment and financing system with innovative models and diverse channels,” with the intention of pooling funds beyond Chinese policy banks like the Eximbank.

China classifies BRI projects via public announcements, MoUs and forums like the Belt and Road Portal while emphasising strategic alignment over rigid lists or any obvious criteria. Peripheral additions include infrastructur-enhancingg connectivity projects, often with co-financing from African Development Bank (AfDB), the World Bank and host country financing. Yet, global perceptions cling to a “China-led debt trap” narrative, ignoring Beijing’s own vision. It is time to detach the BRI label from exclusive Chinese financing, embracing the multilateral reality Chinese policymakers envisioned from inception.

This evolution is already underway in East Africa, where implementation delays, debt concerns and reduced Chinese lending have forced hybrid models that prove the BRI’s open architecture works. Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway, a BRI-associated corridor is a prime example. While China Railway Engineering Group (CREC) secured a $2.15 billion construction deal last year for parts of it, AfDB led by syndication, with a $696 million for phase 2 linking it to Burundi and DRC in 2023, together with a $1.2 billion mobilised with Deutsche Bank, Société Générale and Standard Chartered banks. Spain’s Export Credit Agency pledged $3.24 billion in 2024, with the Turk Eximbank co-financing early sections, and World Bank supporting phased funding. This blend diminishes China’s grip, delivering connectivity without sole reliance on Beijing, precisely living up to the “joint contribution” mantra that China advocates.

Kenya exemplifies the shift most starkly. The Kenyan SGR’s early phases (phase 1 from Mombasa to Nairobi and phase 2A from Nairobi to Naivasha) depended on Chinese loans, but phase 2B (Naivasha to Kisumu, extending toward Uganda) pivoted in late last year to public-private partnership, prioritising speed and oversight over Eximbank debt concerns. This avoids the delays plaguing Chinese-financed extensions, like phase 2A’s bottlenecks and aligns with BRI’s non-exclusive financing ethos.

Uganda’s story mirrors the same pragmatism. The Karuma and Isimba hydroelectric dams saw China Eximbank cover 85 per cent of costs, with Uganda’s government equity filling the rest, evidencing host-nation contributions integrated into BRI principles. In line with the same principle, the Ugandan SGR link to Kenya, once BRI-branded, stalled amid feasibility and financing shortfalls. Uganda appointed America’s Citibank to lead syndication and structure the financing, with Turkish firm Yapi Merkezi signing a deal to handle design, construction, procurement, electrification and signalling in place of China Harbour Engineering Co. (CHEC), which was dropped in 2023 after failing to secure Eximbank financing, signaling a broader pivot, as Kampala seeks Western capital to bypass Beijing’s hesitancy post-debt audits.

Even Ethiopia, a BRI early adopter via its 2016 MoU, weighs alternatives. While Chinese firms built the Addis-Djibouti Railway, recent talks have focused on rescheduling debts rather than fund expansions, prompting explorations of AfDB and EU loans for light rail upgrades. Tanzania, too, diversified after Chinese bids faltered. It tapped Standard Chartered’s $1.46 billion 2020 loan for the Dar es Salaam-Makutupora SGR line, blending Sinosure guarantees with commercial depth.

These cases debunk the myth of BRI as “Chinese-built, Chinese-paid.” Beijing never mandated exclusivity and projects gain BRI status through MoUs and announcements, rather than funding sources. Reduced Chinese outflows, occasioned by domestic slowdowns, have accelerated this trend, with East African states leveraging AfDB’s $170 billion annual infrastructure call, Western financing as well as domestic sources. The Uvinza-Musongati SGR, for instance, started with AfDB’s $696 million as primary funding before CREC’s supplemental role, reflecting blended trends over replacement.

Detaching BRI from Chinese dominance benefits all. For Beijing, it sheds “debt trap” stigma, validating its multilateral rhetoric evident in connectivity projects that are BRI aligned but Multilateral Development Banks led. For recipients, it means alternative and faster delivery. Kenya’s PPPs outpace SGR delays, Uganda avoids Eximbank renegotiations. Globally, it fosters true “multilateralism,” pooling BRI infrastructure financing risks via diverse funders and models.

Critics might argue this dilutes BRI’s essence, however, China’s own words counter this argument. The lack of a centralised register reinforces Chinese primacy whilst ambiguity allows “BRI-aligned” flexibility. Therefore, East Africa’s pivot isn’t rejection but rather, a realisation that BRI is a multilateral venture, geopolitics notwithstanding. As Citibank, Deutsche, and AfDB step up, the BRI evolves from Beijing’s blueprint to a global mix, fulfilling its founders’ vision. Policymakers in Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam and Addis Ababa should champion this publicly, urging forums like the next Belt and Road summit to codify diverse financing. The tracks are being laid; the world will need to run the trains.

The writer is an Africa-China analyst and International relations practitioner