WANJAWA: War strategists ignore painful civilian reality behind Iran conflict

Long before the first missiles flew in this latest escalation, ordinary Iranians were living under the weight of sanctions and economic isolation /FILE

When analysts speak of the war between the United States and Israel against Iran, they often speak thelanguage of deterrence, nuclear thresholds, missile ranges and regime change.

They debate redlines, strategic depth and regional balance of power. But beyond the strategic maps and televisedbriefings lies another reality: the lived experience of ordinary Iranians whose daily struggles rarely makeglobal headlines.

Long before the first missiles flew in this latest escalation, ordinary Iranians were living underthe weight of sanctions and economic isolation. After the unravelling of the 2015 nuclear deal - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - the reimposition of American sanctions deepened Iran’s financial crisis. Oil exports, once the backbone of state revenue, plummeted. Access to international banking systems shrank. Foreign investment evaporated.

The effects were felt in the marketplace rather than in policy rooms. The Iranian currency, therial, lost much of its value. Inflation surged, often reaching punishing levels. Prices of bread,meat, rice and cooking oil rose faster than salaries. Young professionals found their degreesworth little in a shrinking job market. Families sold possessions to make ends meet.War compounds this fragile economic reality.

Military escalation narrows whatever limitedchannels for trade still exist. Insurance premiums rise. Shipping routes grow uncertain. Sanctionstighten further. For the state, defence spending becomes urgent; for citizens, wages lag fartherbehind living costs. The macroeconomic consequences translate quickly into micro-level pain.

Iran is not a passive society. It is a country with a deep civilisational history and a strong senseof national pride. Many Iranians, even those critical of their government, resent foreign attackson their soil. Bombs that fall in Tehran or near nuclear facilities are not seen as abstract strategicgestures but as humiliations and violations of sovereignty.

At the same time, there exists a parallel sentiment  - quiet but powerful  - of frustration towarddomestic leadership. Over recent years, protests have erupted over fuel prices, women’s rights,corruption and economic hardship. Many demonstrators have argued that the state invests tooheavily in regional proxy conflicts while neglecting domestic welfare.

This duality defines much of the Iranian public mood: opposition to foreign interventionalongside dissatisfaction with internal governance. In times of war, however, these strands canintertwine in complicated ways. External attack often triggers a rally-around-the-flag effect.Criticism does not disappear, but it becomes muted, more cautious, sometimes postponed.

Iranian society is already accustomed to constraints: internet filtering, political monitoring andrestrictions on assembly. War intensifies surveillance. Governments facing external threatstypically tighten internal control in the name of national security. For ordinary citizens, this canmean fewer freedoms, stricter enforcement and harsher consequences for dissent.

Yet fear is not uniform. In some neighbourhoods, life continues with a stubborn normalcy - weddings still take place, markets are still open, conversations continue over tea. The resilience ofsociety coexists with anxiety.

The killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei marked a historic rupture. As Supreme Leader, heembodied ultimate authority over military, judicial and executive institutions. His death is notmerely symbolic; it introduces a period of political uncertainty.

For ordinary Iranians, succession debates are less about ideological direction and more aboutstability. Who will lead? Will power be consolidated in the hands of hardline security elements,particularly the Revolutionary Guard? Will there be internal fragmentation? Political uncertaintyoften translates into economic volatility ¾  currency fluctuations, capital flight and administrativeparalysis.

In societies facing external threats, transitions can either create reformist openings or entrenchsecuritised governance. Much depends on elite bargaining behind closed doors - processes thatordinary citizens neither see nor control.

The war sharpens existing divisions. Some Iranians view resistance to the United States andIsrael as an existential defence of sovereignty and independence. Others see prolonged hostilityas a trap that isolates the country from global opportunity.

Younger generations, connected digitally to global culture, often express fatigue with isolation.They aspire to travel, to participate in global markets, to innovate without sanctions barriers. Forthem, endless confrontation feels like a ceiling on possibility. Older or more conservativesegments may prioritise ideological steadfastness and resistance.

Neither perspective is monolithic. What unites them is uncertainty about the future.Ultimately, the Iranian public does not experience the conflict in theoretical terms of deterrenceor nuclear doctrine. It experiences war in grocery receipts, currency exchange rates, internetoutages and worried conversations at family tables.

There exists among many Iranians a desire neither for domination nor capitulation, but fornormalcy: an economy integrated enough to function, governance accountable enough to inspiretrust and a foreign policy stable enough to reduce existential tension.

Whether this war moves the country closer to that aspiration or farther from it will depend notonly on military outcomes but on political choices made in Tehran, Washington and Tel Aviv.For now, ordinary Iranians remain suspended between national pride, economic strain and aprofound longing for a future defined less by confrontation and more by possibility.