Now more than ever before, those working on Kenya’s radicalisation and violent extremism agenda need to target interventions that include countering violent extremist ideologies and recruitment through virtual spaces.
Increasingly, the recruitment and spread of violent extremist ideas have gained huge space, reach, and influence through digital platforms, especially among the youth and other vulnerable groups.
The use of social media, messaging apps, gaming platforms, and related online forums for recruitment, information manipulation, crowdsourcing, and fundraising, among others, are the leading threats posed by violent extremism globally.
To counter this and provide adequate mitigation measures, prevention interventions must increasingly target behaviour change among the most vulnerable, rather than one-off campaigns.
Counter-narrative approaches should be inclined towards knowledge, attitude, and behaviour change, and not just sensitisation.
A review and customisation of communication interventions and tools for narrative development is urgently needed, as is the need for information exchange among actors.
Niche messaging, and more importantly the use of appropriate tools for specific communities and audiences guided by accessibility of channels, relevance of applications, and affordability of campaign methodologies adopted are key variables, especially as interventions move into virtual spaces.
While global, regional, and country strategies are overarching, community-specific considerations remain critical. Youth are in virtual spaces, but it should be remembered that even traditional media has converged and now operates online platforms, making integrated communication highly relevant.
Digital platforms, through their various tools including gaming applications, are the new theatre for radicalisation and recruitment, and agencies involved in the fight against terrorism must invest in strategic communications to counter this threat.
Countering violent extremism narratives and deconstructing radical ideologies targeting youth through online platforms are critical interventions.
The involvement of digital platform providers is equally critical, as most of their community rules are unable to effectively deal with the dangers and threats of violent extremism.
Big tech companies must appreciate that while freedom of expression is vital, they must, at the design and innovation level, provide adequate mitigation measures.
They host the applications and games that lure youth online and, by extension, make them targets for recruitment into violent extremism.
They must not focus solely on the opportunities they gain or hide behind support for free speech at the expense of protecting communities against radicalisation threats.
On the criminal aspect, they must work with governments to ensure platforms do not become agents of crime. They have a responsibility to society.
It is imperative and urgent that government, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and other non-state actors—including the private sector, faith-based organisations, and civil society intensify collaborative and joint actions to protect against recruitment through virtual spaces and strengthen efforts to implement the country’s multi-agency operations.
The involvement of tech companies and communities in implementing proactive media and digital literacy programmes across communities, especially among youth in both formal and informal education institutions, with messaging on the dangers of consuming harmful content, is needed now more than ever.
We must move prevention of violent extremism conversations into digital spaces using sharp and targeted messaging, as traditional counter-narrative campaigns are unable to keep pace with developments online.
Most youth are on Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, and related platforms, and that is where campaigns must be taken. Unlike a few years ago, when media was the oxygen of terrorism, virtual spaces have taken over and are now the primary arena of action.
Current prevention efforts by governments and other actors have yielded results, but more must be done as recruitment increasingly shifts online. Governments must strengthen security operations through enhanced intelligence gathering, information sharing including cross-border collaboration and deterrence measures.
Non-state actors should increase community resilience against the negative effects of terrorism through counter-narratives, media and digital literacy, online messaging, and counter-radicalisation efforts. Media security dialogues are also necessary to minimise undue publicity for terrorist activities while ensuring information sharing does not compromise national security.
Cooperation among the various players is particularly strategic to ensure coordination across sectors, including nurturing partnerships between communities, civil society, governments, and security agencies.
This collaboration is essential in addressing security challenges arising from violent extremism and in enabling communities and security agencies to embrace technology in identifying and responding to early warning signs of radicalisation and violent extremism.
Trends in terrorism financing have been established through research, and the outcomes must be disseminated to support necessary interventions.
With collaboration between security agencies and the media, these trends can be exposed. Terrorism financing is increasingly occurring online, including through online banking, transnational crime networks, organised criminal gangs, cross-border poaching activities, gaming platforms, and related channels.
With intelligence support, the media can trace and expose such activities through investigative reporting, thereby helping to name and shame perpetrators.
Stakeholders in the sector must leverage online platforms and local-based media spaces to scale up interventions targeting vulnerable groups in areas where violent extremism has taken root, in order to build resilience against harmful narratives.
The media must increasingly be included in ongoing efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism. Journalists are often exposed to physical danger during security operations, risk being targeted by terrorist groups or security agencies, face trauma from what they witness, or risk recruitment or radicalisation themselves.
Specific interventions are therefore required for the media, as they constitute a high-risk group in the fight against terrorism.
The Media Council of Kenya Code of Conduct for Media Practice (2025) has already included provisions on artificial intelligence in the media, user-generated content, and gaming, restricting their use in exploiting vulnerable populations.
discussion must now be taken to the doorsteps of digital platform providers.
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