Ethnic fault lines are increasingly being fought online, where political remarks, local conflicts and false claims can rapidly become national battles over identity.
A new report by Code for Africa and funded by the European Union warns that social media platforms are becoming powerful spaces for spreading ethnic, xenophobic and exclusionary narratives as Kenya moves towards the 2027 General Election.
The report, Weaponised Identity and Digital Polarisation in Kenya, examined online conversations between December 2025 and May 2026 and found that Facebook, TikTok and X were increasingly being used to amplify narratives portraying particular communities as outsiders, threats or undeserving of political power.
The findings echo Kenya’s familiar ethnic politics, which is acquiring a new and potentially more potent dimension on digital platforms.
A political remark made in a village in one corner of the country probably in a local dialect is rapidly transformed online into a much wider campaign against an entire community.
This comes at a time when politicians are increasingly making inflammatory statements, leading to national outrage.
A number of them have already been summoned by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.
They include Mukurweini MP John Kaguchia, Homa Bay Town MP Peter Kaluma, Busia Governor Paul Otuoma and Public Service CS Geoffrey Ruku. Others, including DCP leader, DCP leader Rigathi Gachagua, Kajiado Governor Joseph ole Lenku and nominated MP Joseph Wainaina, have also been summoned.
According to the report, the scale of the amplification is striking.
A conflict between Kamba farmers and Somali pastoralists in Kitui, for instance, generated 13,843 mentions on X between March 29 and May 6, attracting 2.43 million views and 75,434 interactions.
On Facebook, a sample of 225 posts about the conflict accumulated approximately 19 million views and 213,900 reactions, while 10 TikTok posts generated another 670,590 views and 46,497 interactions, the report shows.
The dispute was over increasingly scarce water and grazing resources and escalated after killings and retaliatory attacks.
But online, the conflict quickly acquired an ethnic character, with Somalis portrayed as violent, criminal and linked to terrorism. Some posts called for Somali livestock to be attacked, while demonstrations in Mwingi carried the slogan “Msomali arudi kwao”—Somalis should return home, the study says.
Other online users went further, alleging the government was deliberately engineering the conflict to deepen ethnic divisions and divert public attention from the 2027 elections. The report does not establish that claim, but its circulation illustrates how quickly a local security and resource dispute can acquire a political interpretation online.
The Somali community has faced similar treatment in other online conversations.
Between December 3, 2025 and January 14, 2026, the report indicates, 6,522 mentions linking Somalis to fraud generated 1.95 million views and 61,826 engagements on X. The conversations portrayed Somalis as fraudulent, disloyal and undeserving of citizenship or political participation.
The report says some of these narratives also acquired an explicitly political dimension, including claims that Somalis were being brought in strategically as potential voters ahead of the 2027 election.
Citizenship, voting rights and political representation themselves are becoming targets of identity-based narratives.
That was evident in Busia, where online users questioned whether a youth leader with a Luo surname could legitimately represent the Teso community.
Half of the comments analysed in response to posts about Teso North youth spokesperson Brian Oduori opposed his candidature, largely because of perceptions about his ethnicity. Some users argued that the position should be held by someone of Teso origin.
The implication is troubling for a country whose Constitution guarantees political participation irrespective of ethnic origin: social media debates are increasingly turning ancestry into a test of political legitimacy.
The same pattern emerged in Nakuru, where tensions between Kalenjin and Kikuyu members of UDA were already rising.
In February, a digital card falsely attributed an inflammatory statement to Senate Majority leader Aaron Cheruiyot, claiming that Nakuru was not for Kikuyus and that they would be chased away.
There was no evidence Cheruiyot had made the statement and no accredited media had reported it. Yet the alleged quote attracted 597 mentions, 296,000 views and 8,000 engagements on X. One response warned: “This is how 2007 started.”
The case identified in the report points to the emerging digital political environment where false information does not need to be true to have political consequences.
A fabricated statement can exploit an existing ethnic tension, travel across platforms and reinforce fears rooted in the country’s history of electoral violence.
Politicians have, however, been pointed as being the source of hate and divisive remarks.
At a Kisii rally in February, Gachagua referred to Nyaribari Chache MP Zaheer Jhanda as muhindi, questioning whether voters wanted him as their representative.
The remarks triggered 3.45 million Facebook views and more than 40,000 reactions within days. On X, the conversation generated 443,734 views, 1,171 mentions and 8,078 engagements.
The online debate subsequently widened into questions over whether Kenyans of Indian ancestry should be allowed to hold political power, with some users arguing it should remain exclusively with other Kenyans.
The report also documents hostile narratives against South Sudanese and Sudanese refugees, Congolese migrants, Israelis and other foreign nationals.
